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ABSTRACT
One hundred years ago in the United States, confronted by the urgent need
to find a debt workout procedure for large corporate and railroad bond
issuers, the financial community looked at three options: (1) amend the United
States bankruptcy law to permit reorganizations (the predecessor of today's
Chapter 11), not just liquidations of the debtor companies; (2) include
contractual provisions in the underlying bonds that would allow a
restructuring of those instruments with the consent of a supermajority of the
bondholders; or (3) pursue a court-supervised debt restructuring by engaging
the equitable powers of the civil courts to oversee such a process.
A century later, confronted by the urgent need to find a debt workout
procedure for sovereign bond issuers, the same three options are open for
discussion. The International Monetary Fund is actively studying the
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possibility of constructing, at the supranational level, the equivalent of a
"Chapter 11 for countries." The use of contractual provisions to facilitate
sovereign debt workouts-an idea whose time had visibly not come even just a
few years ago-is being reconsidered by both the sovereign borrowers and the
institutional bondholder community in the light of Argentina's catastrophic
debt default in December 2001. Resorting to the equitable powers of the civil
courts to oversee creditor-led sovereign debt workouts is, we believe, possible
in appropriate circumstances.
This Article looks at the existing contractual provisions in sovereign bonds
and the existing legal procedures in the United States to explore how far these
may be enlisted to further the goal of orderly sovereign debt rearrangements.
The Article concludes that these existing contractual provisions and civil
procedures-if used creatively and confidently-can go much further toward
achieving this goal than conventional wisdom would suggest. Moreover, such




Multicreditor debt instruments such as bonds and syndicated bank loans are
uncommon legal arrangements. In most contracts, the parties know each
other's identity beforehand, and they make a conscious decision to enter into a
legal relationship. In a multicreditor debt instrument, the borrower's identity is
of course known by each investor, but what the investors don't know-what
they often never know-is the identity of each other. Bond investors are like
the patrons in a theater audience: each one has decided to see a particular play
on a particular night, but none has any idea who she will be seeing it with. If
you wish to carry the analogy further, the tradable nature of bonds means that
fellow patrons are constantly leaving and entering the theater throughout the
performance.
Now this promiscuous grouping of investors in a bond issue is not
troubling as long as you believe that the only important relationship here is that
between the debtor and each separate investor. Look at a bond issue close
enough, this theory contends, and you will see that it breaks down atomically
into hundreds or thousands of bilateral contracts between the bond issuer and
each investor; the appearance of an investor group or syndicate is just that, an
appearance, with few practical or legal implications. This view assumes, of
course, that all bondholders are the passive recipients of payments from the
issuer and that the behavior of any one bondholder is a matter of indifference
to the other bondholders.
And so it may be, but only until things go wrong. It is when the bond
issuer runs into financial difficulties that the actions of any one bondholder can
dramatically affect the interests of all the other lenders. For example, if each
holder has the unfettered discretion to accelerate its bonds following an event
of default, to commence a lawsuit and attach the borrower's assets, to force a
foreclosure on collateral or to push the borrower into bankruptcy, the other
bondholders may then find that their own options in dealing with the situation
are dangerously curtailed. The ruthful bondholders, however large their
majority, are thus at the mercy of their most ruthless colleagues. Visible
financial strains on the bond issuer will thus bring out a sauve qui peut
response from some bondholders. Grabbing a borrower's assets ahead of one's
fellow bondholders may reveal an underdeveloped fraternal instinct, but it
probably makes good business sense; there usually is little left for the hindmost
creditor.
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By the late nineteenth century, many bond issuers and investors had come
to believe that bondholder cooperation in a distressed situation was highly
desirable. In those days, bankruptcy generally meant liquidation and
liquidation often meant recoveries by the creditors (particularly the unsecured
creditors) of only a small portion of what they were owed. Allowing a single
bondholder to force a liquidation of the debtor or, very nearly as bad, giving
such a holder the leverage to compel other investors to buy him out on
preferential terms in order to forestall liquidation, was therefore something that
many bondholders felt should be avoided.
The problem had several interrelated aspects. How could the "grab and
run" instinct of each bondholder be kept in check long enough to permit a
coordinated workout to the ratable benefit of all creditors? How could the
majority of bondholders ensure that their collective judgment about the terms
of such a workout would be binding on all bondholders? Finally, how could
the majority neutralize the ability of dissident creditors to force a preferential
buyout of their claims as the price of not putting the debtor into liquidation?
Three solutions suggested themselves:
I. Change the bankruptcy laws to shield a debtor from hostile legal
actions while a reorganization and rehabilitation of the debtor's
affairs is carried out.
2. Add contractual provisions to the underlying bonds that would, in
times of financial difficulties for the issuer, permit a majority or
supermajority of the bondholders to direct the course of a negotiated
workout and constrain any maverick elements within the bondholder
group.
3. Engage the equitable powers of civil courts to supervise a negotiated
debt rearrangement while protecting both the borrower and the
majority creditors from exploitation by dissident minorities.
At various times during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, all
three solutions were tried. In England, starting in the late 1870s, contractual
provisions now known as "majority action clauses" began to appear in bonds
and related trust deeds governed by the law of England. These clauses allowed
a supermajority of bondholders to agree to reduce the amount due or to defer a
payment date under a bond. Such a decision, once approved by the specified
majority of holders, was binding on all bondholders, even those who did not
vote in favor of the change.
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For the reasons discussed below, majority action clauses were incorporated
into only a small percentage of bonds issued under the law of a U.S.
jurisdiction in the period 1880-1920. The preferred American solution at this
time was something known as an "equity receivership." Under this procedure,
a group of creditors approached a civil court with a request that the court use
its equitable powers to appoint a receiver for a financially-distressed company
(usually a railroad), while the various stakeholders in the company negotiated
the terms of a debt rearrangement.
By the 1920s, however, the equity receivership technique began to fall into
disfavor. In 1933 (for railroads) and 1934 (for industrial companies) the U.S.
Congress enacted amendments to the Bankruptcy Act that facilitated corporate
reorganizations under the supervision of a bankruptcy judge. These
amendments were the predecessor of the current Chapter 11.
One hundred years on, the financial community is again confronted with a
remarkably similar problem. A sovereign bond issuer of the early twenty-first
century is in much the same spot as the distressed corporate or railroad bond
issuer of the early twentieth century. Court-supervised workouts in a
bankruptcy proceeding are not possible for sovereign borrowers today, just as
they were not available for most corporate issuers in the early part of the last
century. Purely voluntary bond workouts then, as now, were messy, time-
consuming and open to exploitation by holdout creditors. The consequences of
not finding a satisfactory workout mechanism-liquidation for the old
corporate issuer and economic paralysis for the modern sovereign issuer-are
equally devastating for both debtors and creditors.
In the search for measures that will facilitate orderly sovereign debt
workouts, modern commentators are coming up with proposed solutions that
are strikingly similar to the ones that engaged the attention of their
predecessors a hundred years ago. The merits of including majority action
clauses in sovereign bonds as a method of neutralizing the holdout creditor are
being proposed in some circles today, just as they were in the 1920s and 1930s
in the context of corporate bonds. In addition, like the reformers of a hundred
years ago who proposed changes to the U.S. bankruptcy law to permit large
corporate bond issuers to reorganize their capital structure with the approval of
most (but not necessarily all) of the creditors, some modern observers of the
emerging market debt scene are suggesting the establishment of a new
international bankruptcy regime that would be applicable to sovereign debtors.
Indeed, this proposal is sometimes described as a "Chapter II for countries."
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Finally, under appropriate circumstances there may be civil procedures
available in U.S. federal courts that will accommodate a creditor-led, but court-
supervised, sovereign debt workout.
I. OBJECTIVE
We believe that it is difficult to assess the merits of new approaches to
emerging market sovereign debt problems, such as the establishment of a
supranational bankruptcy regime, without a clear understanding of just how far
sovereign debt workouts can be facilitated by the contractual provisions that
already exist in most sovereign bonds or could be managed through existing
procedures in civil courts. The history of sovereign debt restructuring over the
last twenty years has, after all, been primarily a story of muddling through.
Whatever the fate of the more ambitious proposals to change the current
system, the world will almost certainly have to muddle through for at least
another few years before those changes are implemented. This means, in
practical terms, using the tools we already have to promote orderly workouts.
Perhaps it also means using those tools more creatively and more confidently.
Against this backdrop, this Article will focus on four questions:
" What contractual provisions now exist in sovereign bonds that
could promote a voluntary restructuring of those instruments?
* How far can these provisions be pushed in order to mimic
important features of a domestic bankruptcy regime such as a
protection from disruptive litigation while a workout is underway?
* What legal doctrines may constrain the use of these contractual
provisions for this purpose?
* What procedures may be available in U.S. federal courts to
oversee and implement a restructuring of a foreign sovereign's
bond indebtedness?
The interesting issue of how documentation practices for sovereign debt
instruments might change in the future to facilitate collective creditor response
to a debt problem is beyond the scope of this Article.
2002]
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II. COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING PROVISIONS
Bonds issued by both corporate and sovereign borrowers in the early
nineteenth century rarely contained provisions that contemplated collective
decisionmaking by the bondholders. Each bond was a freestanding debt
instrument; its terms could not be changed without the consent of its holder,
and, if not paid when due, each holder was free to pursue her individual
remedies against the issuer. The instruments did not require a holder to consult
with, much less to act in concert with, fellow bondholders before, during or
after a default.
Although this approach ensured that each bondholder's claim against the
borrower could not be deranged without that bondholder's consent, it also had
the consequence of forcing financially-distressed corporate borrowers into
bankruptcy (which in those days meant liquidation). The bondholders, acting
as a group, lacked the legal power to agree to a temporary deferment of their
claims or a partial reduction in the amounts due under the bonds in order to
preserve their debtor as a going concern from whom payments, even if late or
less than originally stipulated, could be expected. Of course, individual
bondholders were always free to give the borrower some reprieve on their own
claims, but they could not compel their fellow bondholders into similar acts of
generosity. Thus, the indulgence of a few or even a majority of bondholders
only enabled the more stiff-necked creditors (upon whom the cognomen
"holdout" was bestowed) to be paid in full and on time. This was, is, and ever
shall be the "holdout creditor problem" in a debt workout.
A. English Majority Action Clauses
By the second half of the nineteenth century, this rigid legal structure for
bonds came to be regarded in England as contrary to the interests of most
bondholders. Corporate borrowers experiencing temporary liquidity problems
were being forced into liquidation when they might have been saved by a
simple deferment or a reduction of the creditors' claims. Holdout creditors
could use this threat of liquidation to extract preferential settlements at the
expense of the debtor and the other creditors. In response, the London market
began to include in corporate bond issues, or the related trust deeds, a
contractual provision (now often called a "majority action clause") that permits
a supermajority of bondholders voting at a bondholders' meeting to accept
adjustments to the terms of the bonds, including changes to payment terms.
Such adjustments, once accepted by the required supermajority of bondholders,
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are then binding on all holders regardless of whether an individual holder
voted for the change.
The man who claimed paternity for English majority action clauses was
Francis Beaufort Palmer. He announced the year of the clause's birth as 1879.1
An English barrister practicing in the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
Palmer was the influential author of Company Precedents (a book of U.K.
corporate form documents that went through seventeen editions between 1877
and 1960). Palmer's majority action clause must have caught on quickly
because in the 1881 edition of his book, Palmer annotated his first form of
majority action clause with the following explanation:
It is by no means uncommon now to insert [majority action]
provisions ... in a debenture trust deed, enabling the majority to bind
the minority in respect of various matters .... Now it sometimes
happens that a company which has raised a large sum on debentures
falls into temporary difficulties, and, though a large majority of its
debenture holders may be willing to give time or make some
reasonable arrangement, a minority decline to concur, and, in the
result, the company is forced into liquidation. The insertion of
[majority action] provisions . . . meets this inconvenience, and may
save the majority from the tyranny of the minority.2
Majority action clauses are now a regular feature of both corporate and
sovereign bonds governed by the law of England. 3 Although one occasionally
finds some minor drafting differences, the terms of these modem English
clauses would be instantly recognized by Palmer. A description of a modem
English-style majority action clause appears as Appendix A to this Article. It
permits changes to the payment terms of a bond with the consent of persons
representing seventy-five percent (by amount) of the bonds voting at a
bondholders' meeting that meets certain quorum requirements.
1 FRANCIS B. PALMER, COMPANY PRECEDENTS 122 (8th ed. 1900).
2 FRANCIS B. PALMER, COMPANY PRECEDENTS 271 (2d ed. 1881). By 1900, Palmer allowed himself a
distinctly self-congratulatory tone. "Majority provisions have now been adopted in hundreds of cases and their
usefulness is generally acknowledged," Palmer wrote, "indeed, the draftsman who omits to insert [a majority
action clause] runs the risk of being accused of neglecting the best interests of the debenture or debenture stock
holders." PALMER, supra note 1, at 123.
3 See Liz Dixon & David Wall, Collective Action Problems and Collective Action Clauses, FIN.
STABILITY REV., June 2000, at 142, 145 ("Provisions for bondholders' meetings and majority action clauses
are routinely included in bonds governed by English law .... ).
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B. American Amendment Clauses
A similar dilemma faced U.S. bond issuers of the late nineteenth century.
An issuer confronting temporary liquidity problems could always seek the
voluntary consent of its bondholders to defer or reduce payments, only at the
risk of inviting exploitation by holdout creditors. Bankruptcy was an option,
but a terminal one. Not until 1934 did U.S. bankruptcy law contain effective
procedures for a "reorganization" of corporate debts that would save a
company from liquidation and safeguard it against preferential demands by a
few dissenting creditors. 4 The English solution to this dilemma-widespread
use of majority action clauses in corporate bonds and indentures-did not,
however, win great support in the United States during this period.
5
The initial resistance to the use of majority action clauses in U.S. bonds did
not reflect a concern about the validity of the clauses. Rather, it resulted from
a worry that a provision permitting a post-issuance change to payment terms
might impair a bond's status as a negotiable instrument under the Negotiable
Instruments Law (NIL). A negotiable instrument, as defined in the NIL, had to
contain "an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money...
[and] be payable on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time .... ,,6
With this cloud over their status as negotiable instruments, the New York
Stock Exchange was reluctant to list bonds containing majority action clauses,
and major bond issuers and their underwriters resisted the clauses for this
7
reason.
In light of this reluctance to employ majority action clauses, Yankee
ingenuity came up with another solution to corporate debt workouts in the
form of a procedure known as an equity receivership. This involved seeking
4 For a brief description of this history, see DAVID SKEEL, DEBT'S DOMINION 105-107 (2001); see also
Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5
(1995).
5 On the evolution of these clauses in England and the United States, see De Forest Billyou, Corporate
Mortgage Bonds and Majority Clauses, 57 YALE L.J. 595 (1948); Charles H. Haines, Jr., Corporations-
Modification Provisions of Corporate Mortgages and Trust Indentures, 38 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1939); Howard
J. Kashner, Majority Clauses and Non-Bankruptcy Corporate Reorganization-Contractual and Statutory
Alternatives, 44 Bus. LAW. 123 (1988); Robert Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain
Developments of the Last Decade, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 927 (1927); Note, The Rights and Remedies of the
Bondholder Under Corporate Bonds and Indentures, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 580-87 (1927) (explaining the
rationale for using collective action provisions and the level of judicial scrutiny that courts gave to these
clauses).
6 UNIF. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 1(2)-(3) (1896), 3B U.L.A. app. I at 507 (1992).
7 See Billyou, supra note 5, at 597.
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when the issuer runs into financial difficulties, a liquidation or an expensive
equity receivership could be avoided. 1 Moreover, the clauses prevented a
minority of bondholders from extorting a preferential settlement by threatening
liquidation of the company or delaying a reorganization.
The SEC, however, did not count itself among the fans of wider use of
majority action clauses to solve the holdout creditor problem. As part of its
general investigation of reorganizations and bondholder protective committees
in the mid-1930s, the SEC also looked at how majority action clauses had been
used in the relatively small percentage of U.S. bonds that contained such
clauses. Although the SEC acknowledged that the arguments in favor of using
majority action clauses to facilitate corporate debt reorganizations had merit,
the Commission concluded that these clauses had sometimes given rise "to
abuses and problems which must be faced if the interests of security holders
are not to be made subordinate to the desires and conveniences of the dominant
group."' 12 The SEC seemed particularly concerned that bond majority action
clauses could be abused by corporate insiders. By buying up or otherwise
controlling a majority of a distressed company's bonds, for example, the equity
owners could vote to suspend or reduce payments on the bonds, thus allowing
value to move down the corporate chain to the equity holders-an inversion of
the normal priorities in a corporate bankruptcy by which a company's debt
holders are paid off before the equity holders. 13
In response, the SEC proposed, and Congress enacted in 1939, section
316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (TIA).14 This section (known as the "voting
prohibition") prohibits any reduction in the amount due under a publicly-issued
corporate bond without the consent of each affected bondholder. Section
316(b) makes a small concession to majority action clauses by authorizing
short deferments of payment dates (up to three years) with the consent of
holders of at least seventy-five percent of the bonds.
The same year that the SEC was established, 1934, also saw an important
amendment to the U.S. Bankruptcy Act. A new procedure, known as Section
11 RALPH A. MCCLELLAND & FREDERICK S. FISHER, JR., THE LAW OF CORPORATE MORTGAGE 13OND
ISSUES 818-22 (1937) (recommending a form of majority action clause for U.S. bonds that permitted
adjustments to payment terms with the consent of holders of 90% of the bonds). See also VI SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM'N, supra note 10, at 145-51.
12 VI SEC. AND ExCH. COMM'N, supra note 10, at 150.
13 See Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 250-52 (1987).
14 Trust Indenture Act of 1939, ch. 411, 53 Stat. 1172 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp
(2000)).
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the intervention of a court to appoint a receiver for a financially-distressed
borrower (the technique was particularly popular for down-on-their-luck
railroads, of which there were many) while the debtor and the various classes
of creditors negotiated a plan of reorganization. At the end of the process,
assuming agreement among most creditors could be reached, the company's
assets were sold-invariably to a new enterprise formed by the creditors of the
old company-and life would go on under a different corporate skin.
Nonparticipating creditors could expect, at best, to receive their pro rata share
of the liquidation value of the old company's assets and thus prospective hold-
out creditors were strongly encouraged to join the party. 8
By the late 1920s, however, even the proponents of the equity receivership
technique began to have second thoughts about its continued utility.
9
Negotiating such a reorganization could take a long time; dissenting creditors
could and often did object to a plan, thereby causing further delays; the
reorganizations were usually controlled by corporate insiders; and the lawyers
and bankers involved in the process extracted large fees. Moreover, when the
new Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) came into existence in 1934,
one of its first mandates was to examine the equity receivership process from
the standpoint of fairness to the investors. The SEC did so, at extravagant
length, and produced a highly critical, multivolume report of its findings. 10
Growing disenchantment with equity receiverships cast a more appealing
light on the potential use of majority action clauses to effect a "reorganization
by contract" of a company's debts. Advocates of majority action clauses in
U.S. bonds urged the same rationale as had their English counterparts: if the
supermajority of bondholders are given the ability to adjust payment terms
8 One of the best descriptions of the equity receivership process can be found in VII SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM'N, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND
FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES 10-60 (1937-1940). For a description of
equity receiverships that sets them in the context of developments in U.S. bankruptcy law, see SKEEL, supra
note 4. For other materials discussing the equity receiverships of this period, see DOUGLAS BAIRD & THOMAS
JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 960-64 (2d ed. 1990); I SILVESTER E.
QUINDRY, BONDS AND BONDHOLDERS: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES § 34 1(c), at 457 (1934); TABR, supra note 4, at
21-24; Arthur H. Dean, A Review of the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 26 CORNELL L. Q. 537 (1941);
Jeffrey Stern, Note, Failed Markets attd Failed Solutions: The Unwitting Formulation of the Corporate
Reorganization Technique, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 783 (1990). For a contemporary judge's perspective on the
development of equity receiverships, see Warner Bros. Pictures v. Lawton-Byrnte-Bruner Ins. Agency Co., 79
F.2d 804, 810-12 (8th Cir. 1935).
9 See James N. Rosenberg, An Open Letter Containing Proposalsfor Amendnent of the Bankruptcy Act
so as to Aid in Combating the Depression, 19 VA. L. REV. 333, 334 (1932) (an amendment to the bankruptcy
law "[m]ust cut out, root and branch, the present red tape and waste of [Equityl Receiverships").
10 I-VilI SEC. AND ExCH. COMM'N, REPORT, supra note 8.
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77B (the predecessor of the modern Chapter 11), was added to the Act in order
to facilitate corporate debt reorganizations under the supervision of a
bankruptcy court.' 5 Thus, when the SEC set its cap against using majority
action clauses to effect debt rearrangements with the consent of only a majority
or supermajority of creditors, it did so in the sure and certain knowledge that a
corporate debtor and its creditors now had another viable option-a
reorganization in bankruptcy subject to the supervision of an impartial referee
in the form of the bankruptcy judge.16 This option had not been available to
most corporate debtors in prior periods. The voting prohibition requirements
of the TIA have, since 1939, governed the drafting of the amendment clauses
in publicly-issued corporate bonds and indentures in the United States.
Although the TIA is not applicable to foreign sovereign bonds issued in the
United States, the amendment clauses included in such sovereign bonds have
almost invariably followed the TIA-driven approach to amendments. 17 The
amendment clause found in most sovereign bonds issued under the law of a
U.S. jurisdiction permits amendments or modifications to the instrument with
the consent of holders of fifty-one percent (or sometimes 66 2/3%) of the bonds,
except that the consent of each affected bondholder is required to defer a
payment date, reduce any amount of principal or interest due under the bond,
change the currency of payments, or take certain other enumerated actions. An
example of such a clause appears as Appendix B to this Article. A minority of
emerging market sovereign bonds issued under the law of a U.S. jurisdiction
employ a more abbreviated amendment clause (see Appendix C) that requires
the unanimous consent of affected creditors to change the "terms of payment"
of the bonds.
American drafting conventions for amendment clauses in sovereign bonds
may be explained by the familiarity of U.S. investors with "unanimous
consent" amendment clauses in corporate issues; it may evidence a conscious
preference on the part of American investors for bonds that are more difficult
15 See TABB, supra note 4, at 28.
16 See UPIC & Co. v. Kinder-Care Learning Ctrs., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 448, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("The
Securities land] Exchange Commission was undoubtedly aware that requiring unanimity in bondholder
voting-rather than mere majority action-would frustrate consensual workouts and help induce bankruptcy.
And convinced that insiders or quasi-insiders would damage bondholders, the Commission welcomed this
prospect.*).
17 See Albert S. Pergam, Eurobonds: Trustees, Fiscal Agents and the Treatment of Default, in
ADAPTATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF CONTRACTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE 335, 337-38 (N.




to restructure (on the theory that this wards off casual requests to restructure);
or it may have just been the product of the drafting momentum so well known
to every practicing corporate lawyer (the last corporate bond indenture
becoming the model for the next sovereign bond indenture). Significantly,
however, the reasons that led to the demise of majority action clauses in U.S.
corporate bonds after 1939 are not applicable to sovereign bonds issued in the
United States. For a sovereign issuer, there is no bankruptcy alternative, either
by way of a reorganization or a liquidation. In this sense, the position of a
sovereign issuer and its creditors today is much closer to that of a corporate
borrower before the 1934 amendments to the bankruptcy law that facilitated
corporate debt reorganizations. Moreover, the SEC's concern about the
possible abuse of majority action clauses to subvert the normal priorities in a
bankruptcy (debt paid out first, equity last) is not relevant to a sovereign
borrower that cannot go bankrupt and, in any event, has no equity holders.
C. Acceleration Clauses
Bonds issued in the international markets by emerging market sovereigns
typically require a vote of twenty-five percent of the outstanding bonds in
order to accelerate unmatured principal following an event of default. This
practice follows the general rule for corporate bonds issued in the United
States.1 However, there are exceptions to this rule. In bond issues using a
trust indenture (as opposed to a fiscal agency agreement), the trustee often
retains the discretionary power to accelerate following the occurrence of an
event of default. Also, the common practice in emerging market sovereign
bond issues that are registered with the SEC (so-called "Schedule B" issues) is
to give individual holders the right to accelerate their own bonds following
certain events of default such as a missed payment or, in some issues, the
declaration of a debt moratorium by the sovereign issuer. This right of
individual acceleration is not, however, a common feature of sovereign bonds
issued in the Eurobond market.
Many, but not all, sovereign bonds give the holders of a majority or
supermajority of the bonds the ability to reverse a prior acceleration of the
issue if all events of default have either been cured or waived. Such a de-
acceleration can usually be accomplished with the approval of holders of fifty
18 See AM. BAR FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVISIONS § 5-2, at 217-
19(1971).
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percent of the securities, but some sovereigns have agreed to a higher level of
up to seventy-five percent in their bond issues.'
9
The ability to rescind a prior acceleration through a collective action of the
bondholders can have great tactical significance for a sovereign borrower that
seeks a restructuring of the bonds. Following Ecuador's 1999 default on its
Brady bonds and Eurobonds, for example, one series of the Brady bonds (the
"Discount Bonds") was accelerated by holders of twenty-five percent of that
series. 2 Eleven months later, Ecuador made an offer to exchange its
outstanding Eurobonds and Brady bonds for new instruments that conveyed a
substantial measure of debt relief to Ecuador. This offer was conditioned upon
a rescission of the acceleration of the Discount Bonds (a step that required the
approval of holders of fifty percent of that issue), and, as part of the closing of
the exchange offer, such a de-acceleration was in fact accomplished .2
D. Enforcement Restrictions
Where sovereign bonds are issued under a trust indenture (the U.S.
practice) or a trust deed (the English practice), an individual holder's right to
bring a legal action against the sovereign issuer will be significantly curtailed.
In English trust deeds, only the trustee has the power to enforce the instrument
and individual bondholders cannot act independently against the issuer unless
the trustee, having been so instructed by a specified percentage of bondholders,
22fails to commence an enforcement action. Any recoveries by the trustee must
23be shared pro rata among the bondholders.
American trust indentures operate somewhat differently. As a result of an
express requirement of the TIA (applicable to corporate issues but normally
followed in sovereign issues as a matter of drafting convention), each
bondholder has an unqualified right to bring an individual enforcement action
to recover her share of any amounts of principal and interest not paid on their
19 See, e.g., Fiscal Agency Agreement between the Republic of Argentina and Bankers Trust Company,
as Fiscal Agent, dated as of October 19, 1994, at 19 (establishing a 75% threshold for rescinding an
acceleration).
20 See Lee C. Buchheit, How Ecuador Escaped the Brady Bond Trap, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 2000, at
17, 18.
21 Republic of Ecuador, Offering Circular dated July 27, 2000, Offer to Exchange U.S. Dollar
Denominated Step-Up Global Bonds due 2030 and 12% U.S. Dollar Denominated Global Bonds due 2012, at
pages 12-13.
22 See Andrew Yianni, Resolution of Sovereign Financial Crises-Evolution of the Private Sector




24respective due dates. Apart from this individual right to recover overdue
amounts, however, only the trustee has the right to pursue other remedies,
25including the important right to sue for accelerated amounts. Similar to an
English trust deed, individual bondholders will not recover the ability to pursue
these other remedies unless the trustee, after having been instructed by holders
of at least twenty-five percent of the bonds and offered satisfactory
indemnification, fails to commence an enforcement action for a specified
period (usually sixty days) after notice from the bondholders. 26
All of this said, most foreign sovereign bonds issued in the U.S. market do
not use a trust indenture or appoint a trustee to represent the economic interests
of the bondholders.27 The more popular approach has been to issue such bonds
using a fiscal agency agreement. A fiscal agent is the agent of the bond issuer
itself. Accordingly, fiscal agency agreements do not concentrate enforcement
-r;ights in the fiscal, agent; each bondholder retains those rights in respect of her
own bonds, including the right to sue for accelerated amounts.
Ill. LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF COLLECTIVE
DECISION-MAKING PROVISIONS
A. Historical Summary
To summarize, the historical evolution of majority decision-making
provisions in corporate and sovereign bonds issued in the United States
proceeded roughly as follows:
1880-1920 Majority action clauses were used in only a minority
of bonds issued in the United States, mainly as a
result of concerns about the effect of such clauses on
the negotiable character of the instruments.
Chapter 1 I-type bankruptcy procedures that
neutralize the holdout creditor problem were not yet
available for most debtors.
24 See Marcel Kahan, Rethinking Corporate Bonds: JTe Tradeoff Between Individual and Collective
Rights, 24 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1040 (2002).
25 See UPIC & Co. v. Kinder-Care Learning Ctrs., Inc., 793 F. Supp. 448,454 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see also
Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Ladish Co., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1785 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1993) (suggesting,
but not deciding, that only trustee can sue for accelerated amounts).
26 See AM. BAR FOUND., supra note 18, § 5-7 at 232-33.
27 See Dixon & Wall, supra note 3, at 142, 145 ("Itlrustees are still unusual in sovereign issues").
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e 1920s-1930s
* 1940 - Present
* 1999-2001
The homegrown substitute remedy was a technique
known as an equity receivership. This process,
although cumbersome and expensive, permitted a
negotiated workout plan to be developed under a
degree of court supervision.
Equity receiverships came under increasing
criticism. Majority action clauses gained in
popularity as a means of facilitating "contractual
reorganizations" while avoiding the holdout creditor
problem.
A bankruptcy reorganization procedure was added
to the Bankruptcy Act in 1933 (for railroads) and
1934 (for industrial companies). This was the
predecessor of Chapter 11.
The SEC was established in 1934 and promptly
began an extensive investigation into all of the
prevailing techniques for implementing debt
rearrangements, including equity receiverships and
the use of majority action clauses. The SEC found
serious defects in each technique and recommended
that corporate debt workouts be handled under the
new Chapter 11-type bankruptcy reorganization
procedure, with the benefit of court supervision.
Taking this recommendation, the U.S. Congress in
1939 proscribed the use of majority action clauses
in corporate bonds issued to the public in the United
States, thus effectively forcing large corporate debt
readjustments into the new bankruptcy re-
organization process.
American-style amendment clauses (which preclude
modifications to the payment terms of bonds without
the consent of each affected bondholder) became a
uniform feature of bonds, including sovereign
bonds, governed by the law of a U.S. jurisdiction.
Following several sovereign bond defaults in the late
1990s, the official sector began to encourage the
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broader use of majority action clauses in emerging
market sovereign bonds to facilitate orderly debt
workouts, but neither the sovereign debtors nor the
private sector investors showed much enthusiasm for
the idea at the time.
In August 2000, Ecuador used its American-style
amendment clauses to modify the nonpayment
terms of its Brady and Eurobonds in order to
discourage holdout creditors in an exchange offer.
Expressions of praise and outrage, depending on the
source, inevitably followed.
28
Throughout most of this period, no one spent much time debating the
merits of majority action clauses in sovereign bonds issued in the international
capital markets. Until about the middle of the twentieth century, the law of
most countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, would
not permit a sovereign to be sued in foreign courts without the sovereign's
consent. 29 Thus, sovereign bonds-despite their appearance as legally binding
undertakings-did not give bondholders effective legal remedies in national
courts. Elaborate procedures for amending the bonds in the face of the
sovereign issuer's liquidity difficulties must therefore have seemed a bit
superfluous.
By the time these immunity rules were formally changed to permit
bondholders to sue sovereign bond issuers (1976 in the United States30 and
1978 in Great Britain), 31 emerging market sovereigns were no longer
borrowing to any significant extent in the bond markets; the commercial banks
had, with astonishing munificence, replaced bondholders as the principal
private sector creditors to these sovereigns. The debt instrument of choice
during this period was the syndicated commercial bank loan agreement. The
bankers famously came to regret their generosity. Starting in 1982 and lasting
through the early 1990s, the syndicated bank loans to many emerging market
28 See Felix Salmon, The Buy Side Starts to Bite Back, EUROMONEY, April 2001, at 46, 58-59.
29 See LEE C. BUCHHEIT, How To NEGOTIATE EUROCURRENCY LOAN AGREEMENTS 140 (2d ed. 2000).
30 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330, 1602-11 (2000)).
31 State Immunity Act, 1978, 26 Eliz. 2, 33 (Eng.), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123.
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sovereign borrowers were repeatedly rescheduled and eventually partially
written off.
32
In the 1990s, bond investors flooded back into the financing vacuum for
emerging market sovereigns left by the bruised retreat of the commercial
banks.33 The forms of the bonds used in this latest round of capital market
borrowing by sovereign issuers were, however, a legacy of corporate issuer
bond documentation as it had evolved in different countries. The bonds
typically contained certain kinds of collective decision-making provisions
(such as the need for holders of twenty-five percent of the bonds to approve an
acceleration), but-consistent with the drafting conventions that had evolved
in the United States after 1939-the payment terms of sovereign bonds issued
in the United States could not be amended without the unanimous consent of
the bondholders. Bonds governed by the law of England, on the other hand,
continued to use the majority action clauses so favored by English bond
drafters and investors.
Then, the defaults started ... again. Pakistan, Ukraine, Ecuador, and the
Ivory Coast all approached their bondholders during 1999-2001 seeking a
restructuring of bonds issued in the international markets.34 At the time of this
writing, Argentina has embarked on the largest sovereign bond default in
history. Attention has thus once again returned to the question of how orderly
bond workouts, this time for sovereign issuers, can be arranged.
B. hitercreditor Duties
Collective decision-making provisions are intended to allow the creditors
within any one bond or loan syndicate to implement their collective will in the
handling of a debt workout. Stated differently, the purpose of these provisions
is to protect the lenders as a group against the damage that could result from
32 See John Clark, Debt Reduction and Market Reentry Under the Brady Plan, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. Q.
REV., Winter 1993-1994, at 38, 41-45.
33 See Daniel K. Tarullo, Rules, Discretion, and Authority in International Financial Reform, J. INT'L
ECON. L. 613, 624 n.24 (2001) (noting the move by sovereigns to bond financing in the 1990s).
34 For discussions of these defaults, see Michael Buchanan, Emerging Markets: Bailing-Out the Nigerian
Bail-In, GOLDMAN SACHS, Sept. 5, 2001, at 17-18; Barry Eichengreen & Christof Ruh1, The Bail-in Problem:
Systematic Goals, Ad Hoc Means (NBER Working Paper 7653) (April 2000); Int'l Monetary Fund, Involving
the Private Sector in the Regulation of Financial Crises-Restructuring International Sovereign Bonds, Jan.
11, 2001, at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ftlseries/03/; Peter B. Kenen, International Financial
Architecture: What's New? What's Missing, 118-20 (2001), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/
files/chapters-preview/335/4iie2970.pdf; see also Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in
Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59, 64 n. 13, 82 n.83 (2000).
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maverick creditor actions against the borrower and its assets. They also
safeguard both the borrower and the other lenders against efforts by maverick
creditors to extract preferential settlements as the price for their cooperation in
a workout.
The provisions are thus designed to prevent the "tyranny of the minority"
35
in a multicreditor debt instrument. Inevitably, however, they open up the
possibility of correlative abuse-oppression of minorities by the majority
creditors. The American legal doctrines that have attempted to delineate the
boundary between the permissible and impermissible use of collective
decision-making provisions in multicreditor debt instruments can best be
understood in the historical context described above.
1. Phase One: Acknowledgment
When majority-action clauses first began to appear in a limited number of
American bonds in the late nineteenth century, they were intended to give a
corporate bond issuer and its majority creditors an alternative to liquidation of
the debtor in bankruptcy should the need arise. In exercising their powers
under these clauses, however, the majority creditors were assumed to have a
duty-sometimes even described as a fiduciary duty36-to act in the best
interests of all the bondholders. This was how the law was developing in
England (where the clauses had first appeared) and American judges were
prepared to follow that lead.37
A leading case of this era, Hackettstown National Bank v. D.G. Yuengling
Brewing Co., for example, invalidated an attempt to use a majority action
clause to postpone payments due on a corporate bond in light of what the court
construed as "a corrupt and unwarranted exercise of the power of the majority"
bondholders. 38  The Hackettstown decision contained strong language
suggesting that lenders in a multicreditor debt instrument owe each other
39fiduciary duties. When challenged, the use of majority action clauses in a
35 Francis Palmer uses this phrase. See supra text accompanying note 2.
36 See, e.g., Haines, supra note 5, at 67.
37 See Billyou, supra note 5, at 596-97 (describing the applicable law in England and Canada and noting
that modifications in the United States were subject to similar restrictions in terms of court scrutiny); Note,
supra note 5, at 594-86 (stating that majority bondholders were assumed to be acting in the best interests of the
bond class, but suggesting that the courts were especially concerned with collusive arrangements between the
debtor and the majority creditors).
" 74 F. 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1896).
'9 Id. at 112-13.
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variety of corporate debt rearrangements during this period received careful
scrutiny by U.S. courts, and actions taken pursuant to these provisions were
sometimes invalidated if the court found bad faith or abuse on the part of the
majority creditors.
2. Phase Two: Flowering
Most corporate debt workouts during this era (ca. 1880-1920), however,
were not affected by the use of majority action clauses in the underlying bonds.
Rather, they were carried out through the equity receivership technique
described above. Therefore the litigation and commentary of the day dealing
with intercreditor duties in debt rearrangements arose primarily in the equity
receivership context. Significantly, intercreditor duties in these affairs were
understood to run both from the majority to the minority creditors and vice
versa.40 The contemporary literature suggests, for example, that courts would
look with disfavor on speculators who purchased their bonds (presumably at a
discount) while the reorganization was underway and then tried to hold up
completion of a plan that enjoyed broad support among the other creditors.4'
Predictably, the lion's share of the litigation involved complaints by
minority creditors that a proposed equity receivership treated them unfairly.
The equity receivership process, as it had evolved over this period, relied
heavily on the implicit cooperation of corporate insiders and friendly creditors.
Courts were therefore prepared to entertain complaints by minority creditors
40 See, I QUINDRY, supra note 8, at 452. Quindry wrote:
In announcing the disposition of courts of equity in considering reorganization plans, it has been
said that the court will not allow minority bondholders to be disregarded or unfairly treated in such
a plan, yet on the other hand, it will not lend its aid to a scheme by a-minority bondholder of
holding up a fair reorganization solely as a means of obtaining greater value or more favorable
terms for his bonds than are to be given by the plan to the great majority of the bondholders.
Id. (quoting Palmer v. Bankers' Trust Co., 12 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1926)).
41 Like Quindry, Robert Swaine also quotes the language from Palmer on how courts will not support a
minority bondholder's attempt to exploit the equity receivership process:
[A] ... court of equity.., will not lend its aid to a scheme by a minority bondholder of holding up
a fair reorganization, solely as a means for obtaining greater value or more favorable terms for his
bonds that are to be given by the plan to the great majority of the bondholders. Especially is this
true if it should appear that the minority bondholder has bought his bonds pending the
reorganization and for the purpose of speculating thereon.
Swaine, supra note 5, at 923 (quoting Palmer, 12 F.2d at 754, and also citing Guar. Trust Co. of New York v.




that a resulting plan of reorganization may have been too generous to the
insiders. These complaints grew in volume as the proponents of equity
receiverships in the 1920s searched for more efficient methods of discouraging
holdout creditors by, for example, leaving nonparticipating creditors with a
distastefully small recovery at the end of the process. Interestingly, although
the issue was hotly debated in the legal journals by some of the most
prominent practitioners of the equity receivership art, no consensus was
reached as to whether the equitable powers of the supervising court extended
to the point of being able to force nonassenting creditors to participate in a
reorganization that enjoyed broad creditor support and struck the court as
inherently fair.42
3. Phase Three: Erosion
Things began to change dramatically after the amendment of the
Bankruptcy Act in 1934 to add the predecessor of Chapter 11, and after the
passage of the TIA in 1939 that prohibited the use of majority action clauses in
publicly-issued corporate bonds. The availability of a bankruptcy
reorganization procedure meant that minority creditors who felt themselves
aggrieved by the terms of a voluntary debt rearrangement could obtain the
supervision of a bankruptcy judge by forcing the process into a bankruptcy
reorganization.43 Accordingly, there was less and less of a need to infer broad
intercreditor duties in the workouts of multicreditor debt instruments as a
means of countering tyrannical minorities or oppressive majorities.
Also, the abrupt discontinuance of majority action clauses in U.S. bonds
after 1939 meant that courts were no longer confronted with complaints by
minority bondholders that their claims against the debtor were being
42 The debate was between James Rosenberg and Robert Swaine and took place in the pages of the
Columbia Law Review. See James N. Rosenberg, Reorganization-The Next Step, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 14
(1922); Robert Swaine, Reorganization-The Next Step: A Reply to Mr. Jarnes N. Rosenberg, 22 COLUM. L.
REV. 121 (1922). An Eighth Circuit decision, Phipps v. Chicago R.I. & P. Co., 284 F. 945 (1922), handed
down subsequent to the Rosenberg/Swaine interchange, was in line with Rosenberg's argument (which was
that courts did have the power to impose a reorganization solution on a dissenting minority), but the matter
was never decided by the Supreme Court. On Phipps and the debate generally, see Arthur H. Dean, A Review
of the Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 537 (1941); James N. Rosenberg, Phipps v.
Chicago R.I. & P. Co., 24 COLUM. L. REV. 266 (1924); James N. Rosenberg, Reorganization Yesterday Today
Tomorrow, 25 VA. L. REV. 129 (1938).
43 See Wilber G. Katz, The Protection of Minority Bondholders in Foreclosures and Receiverships, 3 U.
CHI. L. REV. 517, 517 (1936) ("[Tlhe problem as to the type of protection, if any, to which [minority creditors]
are entitled ... is worth attempting in spite of the fact that probably a large majority of current reorganizations
are brought about through proceedings under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act.").
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improperly reduced or deferred without their consent. The U.S. law of
intercreditor duties as it applied to majority action clauses was thus arrested
after 1939. This is not to say that American-style amendment provisions in
multicreditor debt instruments were never the subject of legal scrutiny. They
were, but increasingly in the syndicated bank loan context.
The modem U.S. law in this area has turned distinctly hostile to the notion
of implied intercreditor duties in multicreditor debt instruments, particularly in
instruments that involve sophisticated parties and carefully detailed, arm's-
length agreements. 44  Of equal importance, where the multicreditor debt
instrument contains an express collective decision-making provision, U.S.
courts have been reluctant to entertain a claim that the majority's use of the
provision should be encumbered by vague intercreditor duties. 5
C. Intercreditor Duties in Sovereign Debt Instruments
If we are correct in our speculation that the availability after 1934 of a
bankruptcy reorganization procedure for corporate debtors meant that U.S.
courts no longer needed to rely on doctrines of implied intercreditor duties to
enforce fair play among minority and majority creditors in a negotiated
corporate debt workout, this raises the interesting question of whether, for
sovereign debtors that still do not have a Chapter 11 safety net, the older view
of intercreditor duties has some continuing vitality. The question was put
squarely before a U.S. federal district court in 1995 in a case captioned CIBC
44 See Banque Arabe et International D'lnvestissement v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 819 F.Supp. 1282, 1296
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
"[l1n the case of arms length transactions between financial institutions, no fiduciary duty exists
unless one was created in the agreement" ... [and] there is no automatic, status-based fiduciary
duty created [in] the transaction.
Id. (internal citations omitted). For similar language, see also First Citizens Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 919 F.2d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 1990); Aaron Ferer & Sons v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
731 F.2d 112, 122 (2d Cir. 1984); Banco Urquijo, S.A. v. Signet Bank, 861 F. Supp. 1220, 1249-50 (M.D. Pa.
1994); Banco Espanol de Credito v. Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank, 763 F. Supp. 36, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
45 See First Nat'l Bank Ass'n v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12105
(D. Minn. June 9, 1995), where a group of banks in a syndicate entered into a standstill agreement with the
borrower following a missed interest payment, the court rejected one bank's argument that the majority was
obliged to declare a default. See also Yucyco, Ltd. v. Republic of Slovenia, 984 F. Supp. 209, 221 (S.D.N.Y.
1997) (rejecting a minority creditor's claim that agent was obliged to declare an event of default and accelerate
the debt-where the agreement required consent from the majority creditors to accelerate); New Bank of New
England v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 768 F. Supp. 1017, 1021-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting one lender's
argument that the majority was obliged to accelerate as a result of its "implied obligation of good faith" to a




Bank and Trust Co. (Cayman) Ltd. v. Banco Central do Brasil.46 A group of
related (nonbank) entities held a position in the Multiyear Deposit Facility
Agreement (MYDFA) in which the Central Bank of Brazil was the borrower
and the Federative Republic of Brazil was the guarantor. The MYDFA was in
the nature of a large syndicated loan; it had been the contractual vehicle
through which Brazil's public sector debt had been restructured in 1980s. In
1992, Brazil asked all MYDFA holders to exchange their claims under that
instrument for one or more series of new bonds (the choice of the type of new
bond to be at the election of each creditor) issued by the Federative Republic
of Brazil. The owners of this position accepted Brazil's request for the full
amount of their exposure under the MYDFA. Brazil subsequently attempted to
amend its offer by requiring creditors to take a minimum allocation of certain
types of the new bonds. The owners declined to accept this mandatory
reallocation and consequently they were excluded from participating in the
bond exchange. The legal title to this position was subsequently transferred to
CIBC Bank and Trust Co. (Cayman) Ltd.
Just prior to closing the exchange, however, Brazil instructed one of its
state-owned banks, Banco do Brasil (BdB), to withdraw from the exchange a
principal amount of MYDFA debt slightly larger than that held by CIBC, thus
leaving BdB with a majority position in the MYDFA. When CIBC attempted,
after the exchange, to accelerate the unmatured principal due under the
MYDFA (an action requiring the consent of holders of at least fifty percent of
the outstanding amounts), BdB used its MYDFA voting power to block the
acceleration. CIBC then sued in the Southern District of New York.
Citing Hackettstown and other authorities, CIBC argued to the court that
BdB was in an openly collusive arrangement with the MYDFA debtor (the
Central Bank of Brazil) and guarantor (the Federative Republic of Brazil) and
that BdB's vote on the question of acceleration should therefore not be
counted. Among other things, CIBC contended, BdB had breached its
obligation of good faith and fair dealing to its fellow creditors. Although this
was indeed the lesson of Hackettstown, the CIBC court elected to treat this
case strictly as a matter of contract interpretation: the MYDFA itself did not
disenfranchise a creditor who was affiliated with the debtor and the court
declined to read such a disenfranchisement into the contract on the grounds of
implied intercreditor duties.
47
46 886 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
41 Id. at 1118.
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CIBC involved a syndicated loan and the collective decision-making
provision at issue in the case was majority voting for acceleration. 48 If
sovereign bonds issued under the law of a U.S. jurisdiction begin to
incorporate English-style majority action clauses that permit write-downs of
principal or interest claims, however, limiting judicial scrutiny to the four
comers of the contract may not always make sense. Under those
circumstances, we believe that a modem U.S. court would not refuse to hear a
challenge to the legitimacy of a majority's decision to reduce or defer
payments due under the instrument when the facts show a collusive or corrupt
oppression of the minority bondholders by the majority. Because the clauses
themselves do not offer any guidance or standards for deciding when a
majority may have acted improperly, courts would presumably apply olfactory
tests very similar to those used by their late nineteenth century brethren.
Unless courts are prepared to supervise the operation of majority action clauses
in cases where nonassenting minority bondholders can show an abuse by the
majority, as courts were willing to do when the clauses last appeared in
American bonds seventy years ago, these clauses will not prosper as a tool for
achieving creditor-led sovereign bond workouts. We are not suggesting that a
decision of a supermajority of bondholders taken pursuant to a majority action
clause should be overturned lightly, nor should a court substitute its own view
about what might be in the bondholders' best interest for what the holders
themselves have, as a group, decided. But where a majority or supermajority
cannot articulate a commercial justification for its action, a judicial inquiry into
motives may be warranted.
The treatment of sovereign bonds containing American-style amendment
clauses, however, is likely to be quite different. These clauses do not permit an
involuntary reduction of amounts due under a bond or deferment of payment
dates. Thus, the minority bondholders' complaint must be that some other, less
drastic amendment or action sanctioned by the majority should be invalidated.
The very limited law that has developed in the area of amendments to
corporate bonds suggests that such complaints will be hard to sustain.49 When
the clauses say that any modification is permitted with the consent of only a
specified majority of bondholders, apart from certain specifically enumerated
amendments that require unanimous approval, American courts will examine
the challenged amendment with an eye on whether-in a real-world sense-it
48 Id. at 1107.
49 See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 34, at 70-74 (describing cases that analyze the validity of majority
amendments made to U.S. corporate bonds).
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is tantamount to one of the modifications requiring unanimous bondholder
consent. This is more in the nature of a traditional inquiry into whether the
form of a party's behavior under a contract should be permitted to override the
substance of its action. Courts will not, we believe, approach disputes about
American-style amendment clauses from the standpoint of implied
intercreditor duties. There is no reason to do so, and the modern tendency of
U.S. courts to respect the black letter of a financial contract is very strong.
For a sovereign debtor, of course, this prediction is both good and bad
news. Good, in the sense that the validity of majority-approved amendments
to nonpayment terms are likely to be respected. Bad, in the sense that a U.S.
court is unlikely to read into a bond containing an American-style amendment
clause an implied duty on the part of minority bondholders to acquiesce in the
wishes of the majority for a financial restructuring of the instrument.
IV. COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING PROVISIONS IN SOVEREIGN
DEBT WORKOUTS
A. Objectives
How far can collective decision-making provisions in sovereign bonds be
used to facilitate debt workouts? Another way of asking this question is to
inquire whether, and to what extent, these clauses can be used to replicate the
important features of a bankruptcy code, such as the "international bankruptcy
regime" applicable to sovereign borrowers that has been discussed, off and on,
50 See Federated Strategic Income Fund v. Mechala Group Jamaica Ltd., 1999 WL 993648 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 2, 1999). In this unpublished decision, the court was asked to construe an American-style amendment
clause in a bond indenture that listed, as changes requiring unanimous bondholder consent, any change that
would reduce the principal amount of a bond or impair a bondholder's right to institute suit for enforcement of
payment. The amendments at issue sought to move the corporate debtor's assets to another company (not an
obligor on the bonds) and to eliminate certain guarantees for the bonds. The defendant argued that these
amendments, because they did not expressly affect the payment terms of the bonds, required only majority
bondholder approval. The court disagreed:
Taken together, these proposed amendments could materially impair or affect a holder's right to
sue. A holder who chooses to sue for payment at the date of maturity will no longer, as a practical
matter, be able to seek recourse from either the assetless defendant or from the discharged
guarantors. It is beyond peradventure that when a company takes steps to preclude any recovery
by noteholders for payment of principal coupled with the elimination of the guarantors for its debt,
that such action does not constitute an "impairment" or "affect" the right to sue for payment.
Id. at *7.
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for many years. 5' As articulated by its proponents, the principal objectives of
an international bankruptcy system would be:
* to shield the sovereign debtor from disruptive litigation by
individual creditors while the debt workout is underway (the
"automatic stay" feature);
* to ensure that a debt restructuring plan that is acceptable to the
large majority of creditors will bind any dissenting minority
(the "cramdown" feature);
* to facilitate the sovereign's ability to attract new financing
from private sector sources during the workout period (the
"debtor-in-possession" or "DIP financing" feature); and
* to permit a greater level of coordination among the different
types of creditors (banks, bondholders, bilateral creditors, trade
creditors and so forth) caught up in a sovereign debt problem
(the "coordination" feature).
Can current collective decision-making provisions achieve some of these
objectives? We begin by discussing the limitations of the provisions and then
elaborate on the scope of using them.
51 See Ann Krueger, International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt
Restructuring (Nov. 26, 2001), at http://www.imf.org/externa/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm. For prior
versions of this proposal, see David Suratgar, The International Financial System and the Management of the
International Debt Crisis, in DEFAULT AND RESCHEDULING (David Suratgar ed., 1984). See also BENJAMIN
COHEN, DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT: A MIDDLE WAY (1989); THOMAS KAMPFFMEYER, TOWARDS A
SOLUTION OF THE DEBT CRISIS: APPLYING THE CONCEPT OF CORPORATE COMPOSITIONS WITH CREDITORS
(1987); Benjamin Cohen, A Global Chapter //, 75 FOREIGN POL'Y 109 (1989); Christopher G. Oechsli,
Procedural Guidelines for Renegotiating LDC Debts: An Analogy to Chapter II of the U.S. Bankruptcy
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The collective decision-making provisions currently used in sovereign
bonds have some important limitations if one looks to them as the exclusive
tool for expediting debt workouts. First, these provisions-even the most
liberal English-style majority action clauses-operate only within the four
corners of the bond containing the clauses. They therefore cannot be used to
address the coordination problem across bonds. Some other method, as yet
undiscovered or at least unutilized, will be needed to encourage closer
coordination among the various groups of creditors such as the Paris Club,
trade creditors, multilateral creditors, and so forth.
Second, it is in the very nature of collective decision-making provisions
that they operate by a vote of the majority or supermajority of the bondholders.
One prospective holdout creditor, or a small group of similarly-minded
creditors, can therefore effectively control the tactical use of these clauses by
acquiring a blocking position of bonds. For example, if such a creditor
controlled twenty-five percent of the bonds of one issue, it could single-
handedly cause the acceleration of that bond, although perhaps at the risk of
seeing the acceleration later reversed by a vote of fifty percent of bondholders.
Similarly, a twenty-five percent holding will ensure that an English-style
majority action clause could not be used to restructure the instrument without
the concurrence of that twenty-five percent holder. Even amendments to the
nonpayment terms of a U.S. bond can be blocked if the holdout acquires thirty-
four percent (in bonds that set the voting level for modifications to
nonpayment terms at 662/3%) or fifty percent (in bonds that require only
majority approval of such a change) of the outstanding bonds of that issue.
Third, because collective decision-making provisions operate only bond-
by-bond and do not reach out to affect other bond syndicates or other types of
creditors, a sovereign debtor must separately convince each bond syndicate to
go along with the deal. Stated differently, in a negotiated sovereign debt
restructuring (unlike a corporate reorganization under Chapter 11), all
similarly-situated creditors do not vote as a class, and thus soliciting the
"collective will" of creditors in a sovereign context really means seeking action
by separate creditor groups under separate debt instruments. We discuss in
Part V of this Article one idea for a procedural mechanism for homogenizing
similarly situated sovereign bondholders in order to replicate Chapter 1 I -style
class voting.
[Vol. 51
SOVEREIGN BONDS AND THE COLLECTIVE WILL
Fourth, an active sovereign borrower will have placed its bonds in a
number of jurisdictions around the world. As a matter of convention, the
documentation practices in some of these markets (the German retail investor
market is one example) discourage any form of 'collective decision-making
clauses in bonds.
52
Finally, the unanimous consent requirement in American bonds means that
a determined holdout creditor will ultimately have a claim for the principal and
interest due to him under the bond. Amendments effected by the majority of
the bondholders may remove the acceleration remedy or strip financial
covenants out of the bond but, in the end, they cannot involuntarily reduce the
amount of a holdout's claim against the issuer or postpone a scheduled
payment date.
C. The Tactical Use of Collective Decision-making Provisions
Within these limitations, however, collective decision-making provisions
can go at least part of the way toward replicating the features of a domestic
corporate bankruptcy.
1. Cramdown
The best example of a provision that permits a contractual cramdown on
dissenting minority bondholders is an English-style majority action clause.53
As discussed above, this is precisely what the clause was designed to do. A
seventy-five percent vote of bondholders attending a meeting that satisfies
quorum requirements can reduce or defer payments due under the bond
containing this provision, and that decision will bind any nonassenting holders.
52 Interestingly, the German Government has confirmed that, under German law, "no legal impediments
exist to incorporate collective action causes into the bonds of foreign issuers ... provided that the debt
restructuring serves to safeguard the joint interests of all bondholders." Bundesministerium der Finanzen,
Statement by the German Federal Government on the admissibility of including collective action clauses in
foreign sovereign bond issues subject to German law, dated Feb. 14, 2000, 6.
53 Consistent with practice in the sovereign debt area, we loosely use the term "cramdown" to mean that
a dissenting creditor is being forced to agree to a debt restructuring. Under U.S. bankruptcy law, dissenting
creditors within a class can be forced to consent to a restructuring as long as there is approval from two-thirds
of the class in amount and a majority of the claims in number, but this is not what is referred to as a
"cramdown." Instead, a "cramdown" occurs when the plan of reorganization binds a dissenting class of
creditors (which can occur under certain circumstances). For more on the subject of cramdowns under U.S.
bankruptcy law, see Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New




Two countries, Pakistan and the Ukraine, have sought a restructuring of
their English law bonds in recent years. Pakistan, in an exchange offer that
closed in December 1999, elected not to use the majority action clauses in its
bonds to cram down holdouts, reportedly because it feared that calling
meetings of bondholders might produce a less agreeable outcome such as an
acceleration. 54 The Ukraine, in an exchange offer that closed in February
2000, circumvented this problem. By accepting the Ukraine's exchange offer,
each holder of an English law bond automatically gave a proxy to the exchange
agent to vote at a subsequent meeting of bondholders in favor of modifications
to the old bonds that brought them into line with the payment terms of the new
bonds being offered in the exchange.55  The result? Holdouts faced the
prospect of being left with an amended illiquid old bond that paid out no
earlier than the very liquid new bond being offered in the exchange. The
Ukraine could compel this outcome as long as it achieved at least a seventy-
five percent acceptance of its exchange offer for each old bond.
For sovereign bonds with American-style amendment clauses, an
involuntary reduction or deferment of claims will not be possible as a result of
the unanimity requirement in the amendment clauses. Nevertheless,
prospective holdouts can be encouraged to participate in a deal that enjoys the
support of most other bondholders by the prospect of holding old bonds that
have been amended by the majority holders in a variety of disagreeable ways
(short of changing the amount or due date of a payment due under the old
bond) just prior to the closing of the exchange offer. We have discussed this
technique of seeking "exit consents" in a prior article and we will not repeat
that discussion here.56 The technique can be useful in convincing the fence-
sitting bondholder to come along with the majority. Only one sovereign bond
issuer, Ecuador, has in August 2000 made a tactical use of exit consents in a
restructuring of bonds containing American-style amendment clauses.57
Whether U.S. courts will find some exit amendments to be impermissibly
severe on the holdouts remains an open issue: there are no reported cases in the
United States that discuss the validity of the technique in the sovereign context,
and only a few in the area of corporate bond exchanges.
58
54 See Int'l Monetary Fund, supra note 34, at 5, 30-31 (describing the Pakistan restructuring).
55 Id. at 6, 31-33 (describing the restructuring for Ukraine).
56 See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 34.
57 See Buchheit, supra note 20, at 20.
58 See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 34, at 78-82.
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2. Automatic Stay
The automatic stay protection in a U.S. corporate bankruptcy is intended to
stop individual creditors from taking actions, such as lawsuits or set-offs, that
could prejudice the eventual reorganization of the debtor's affairs. Of course,
the legal ability to cram down a plan of reorganization on dissenting creditors
in a corporate bankruptcy means that the automatic stay protection is needed
only during the period before the reorganization becomes effective.
The situation is different in a sovereign debt workout. The threat of
disruptive legal actions while a restructuring is underway is certainly present in
the sovereign context, although holdout creditors have traditionally waited for
a sovereign to complete its restructuring with other creditors before launching
a legal attack. But without a sure ability to cram down a deal on holdout
bondholders, the sovereign debtor must worry about maverick creditor
litigation both before and after completion of a restructuring with the other
bondholders.59
Collective decision-making provisions can provide a significant protection
against maverick lawsuits while the workout is in progress. The customary
requirement that holders of twenty-five percent of the bondholders in a
particular issue consent to an acceleration of the unmatured principal gives a
measure of protection because most bondholders will not wish to sue just for
their share of one or two missed payments. Of equal importance, however, is
the ability of a simple majority (in most bonds) to rescind any prior
acceleration as part of a final workout. The discontented bondholder who is
thinking of pursuing independent legal remedies must therefore face the
possibility that, after months of expensive litigation, the sovereign debtor will
reach an agreement with the majority of its bondholders, the acceleration will
be reversed, and the litigant creditor will be left with a claim only for its share
of any payments that remain unpaid after the settlement. This can be a
powerful disincentive to the commencement of lawsuits before a restructuring
has been concluded.
59 Some commentators have suggested that the threat of litigation by holdouts is being exaggerated. See
Michael M. Chamberlin, Remarks of EMTA Executive Director, The IMF's Sovereign Bankruptcy Proposal
and the Quest for More Orderly Workouts (Jan. 29, 2002), at http://www.emta.org/ndevelop/rider7.pdf;
Institute for International Finance, Summary Report on the Work of the IF Steering Committee on Emerging
Markets Finance at 12 (1999), available at http://www.iif.com/verify/data/publications/ip:scemfO0l.pdf.
Other observers believe that holdouts pose a serious threat to the sovereign debt workout process. See
Gabrielle Lipsworth & Jens Nystedt, Crisis Resolution and Private Sector Adaptation, 47 IMF STAFF PAPERS
188, 211 (2001), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/06/lipworth.htm.
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Finally, in the case of sovereign bonds issued pursuant to a trust deed (in
England) or a trust indenture (in the United States), the restrictions contained
in those instruments on enforcement actions by individual bondholders can
provide a significant degree of protection against maverick lawsuits while a
restructuring is in progress. In effect, holders of twenty-five percent of the
bonds must instruct the trustee to begin an enforcement action for accelerated
principal and, even then, any recovery by the trustee will be shared pro rata
among all the holders. This is not a regime conducive to maverick lawsuits.
As noted above, however, only a minority of foreign sovereign bonds issued in
the United States have employed a trust indenture structure.
3. DIP Financing
We propose to consider in somewhat more detail the question of whether
existing collective decision-making provisions in sovereign bonds can be used
to replicate the debtor-in-possession financings that are a regular feature of
Chapter 1 1 reorganizations for corporate borrowers in the United States. DIP
financings are credits extended to a company (with bankruptcy court approval)
after it has entered into the Chapter 1 I process to allow the company to
continue its business operations while the plan of reorganization is being
worked out.6° In order to encourage lenders to extend new credit, the law
treats these loans as an administrative expense of the bankruptcy and they
enjoy a legal priority over other claims against the debtor.6 1
Now consider the position of a sovereign borrower, the hypothetical
Republic of Ruritania, that encounters temporary difficulties in servicing its
existing external debts. Ruritania does not have a Chapter I I option. Thus, its
choices boil down to two: (1) seek emergency financial help exclusively from
official sector institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, or (2)
approach its private creditors for a restructuring of their outstanding credits to
the country.
Each alternative has drawbacks. Official sector lenders are increasingly
reluctant to pour fresh money into a country only to see those funds flush out
again to repay, in full and on time, private sector creditors. On the other hand,
a full restructuring of private sector credits, quite apart from the damage that
this may do to the country's long-term credit standing and financing prospects,
may in fact be too drastic a remedy for a liquidity-driven problem. A
60 1 U.S.C. § 364(b) (2000).
61 See DAVID L. BUCHBINDER, FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY, A LAWYER'S GUIDE 342 (1991).
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restructuring would involve permanent deferments or reductions in amounts
owed to private creditors. If the liquidity problem can be resolved quickly, a
restructuring will have unnecessarily imposed permanent damage on private
creditors.
(a). Technique
As an alternative to a permanent restructuring of private sector claims,
could Ruritania obtain the equivalent of a DIP financing from a group of
private lenders in order to tide the country over until its liquidity problems are
resolved? This money would presumably come in together with fresh funds
from the official sector institutions.
Such a financing would naturally be very difficult to arrange, and even if
arranged would be prohibitively expensive, unless the new lenders could be
assured of a legally-enforceable priority over existing Ruritanian debts owed to
private sector creditors. The question, then, is whether Ruritania could
convince a critical mass of its existing creditors (and we will assume that these
are bondholders holding bonds with American-style amendment clauses of the
kind set out in Appendix A) voluntarily to subordinate themselves to a specific
new financing (let's call it the "New Loan") that would be used to continue
payments on Ruritania's existing bonds during an interim period, thereby
avoiding the need for a restructuring of those debts.
(b). Legal Analysis
From a legal perspective, such a request from Ruritania would amount to a
proposal that the pari passu clause in Ruritania's existing bonds (the clause
ensuring that the bonds will not be subordinated to any new creditors) be
amended to permit a subordination of each existing bond syndicate to the New
Loan. The terms of a subordination would confirm the agreement of the
existing bondholders that the New Loan creditors will enjoy a senior status.
The subordination would not release or discharge the sovereign's obligation to
make payments on its existing bonds; it would merely evidence an intercreditor
arrangement giving the New Loan seniority over the old bonds (or any
instruments that may be exchanged for those bonds).62 The agent or trustee for
the New Loan would be given the power to enforce the terms of this
subordination.
62 For a discussion of the various types of subordinations, see Dee Martin Calligar, Subordination
Agreements, 70 YALE L.J. 376 (1960).
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Could an amendment providing for such a targeted subordination be
accepted by the majority of bondholders in each existing bond syndicate with
the effect that any nonassenting holders in that syndicate will also be bound by
the terms of the subordination? As noted above, most amendment clauses in
emerging market sovereign bonds issued under the law of a U.S. jurisdiction
have an Edenic character: one may eat from any tree in the garden, or modify
any provision of the bond, with the approval of only a majority (sometimes
662/3%) of the holders except that certain specifically enumerated amendments
require the consent of each affected bondholder. So the analysis first looks to
see whether a targeted subordination falls within the list of unanimous consent
amendments. Does it change a payment date on the old bonds? No. Does it
reduce the amount of principal or interest due under the old bonds? No. Does
it change the currency in which the old bonds are payable? No. Does it alter
the voting percentages of the old bonds? No.
What a targeted subordination may do is make it less likely that Ruritania
will in fact be able to make the payments due on its existing bonds because it
will now be obligated to pay the New Loan as a matter of legal priority. But
the amendment clauses in Ruritania's bonds do not make modifications of this
kind the subject of unanimous consent. The best analogy may be to
amendments to financial covenants such as negative pledge clauses. By
amending a negative pledge restriction to permit Ruritania to pledge an asset to
secure another creditor, the bondholders may have impaired their own ability
to be paid because the proceeds from any sale of that asset will naturally go
first to the secured creditor. The bondholders would presumably not consent to
such a modification unless they believed that giving this flexibility to Ruritania
(i.e., the ability to raise fresh money on a secured basis) was a risk worth
taking. Most American-style amendment clauses leave this kind of judgment
in the discretion of the majority of the bondholders.63
(c). Commercial Analysis
The commercial justifications for Ruritania's bondholders to accept a
targeted subordination to the New Loan may be compelling. The New Loan
(together, perhaps, with new official sector funds) would be intended to avoid
a default on Ruritania's outstanding obligations while the country's liquidity
63 The version of the American-style amendment clause contained in Appendix C to this Article,
however, arguably precludes an amendment involving a voluntary subordination because it refers generally to
changes in "terms of payment."
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problems are being addressed. The worst case scenario for the existing
creditors is therefore one in which Ruritania's financial difficulties persist and
a restructuring becomes inevitable down the road, notwithstanding the New
Loan. But in analyzing whether to accept the targeted subordination, the
choice for existing creditors is the possibility of a restructuring tomorrow
versus the certitude of a restructuring today.
Assuming that the proceeds of the New Loan are committed to the
continued servicing of Ruritania's outstanding debts, the existing bondholders
will receive payments that they might otherwise have been asked to forgo or
defer in a restructuring. The risk for the existing bondholders, of course, is that
should a restructuring eventually become necessary, the financial terms of that
restructuring will to some degree be harsher as a result of the addition of a
legally senior claim (the New Loan) to Ruritania's debt stock. One aspect of
the financial question is whether the benefit of receiving continued debt service
payments while the New Loan is being disbursed outweighs the incremental
severity of restructuring terms should a restructuring prove unavoidable.
Finally, in the absence of a targeted subordination and a New Loan from
private sector sources, Ruritania, if it is to avoid a compulsory restructuring,
would look to borrow from international financial institutions such as the
World Bank and the IMF. Even if those lenders were prepared to be the sole
providers of new funding (and there is reason to doubt whether, in light of the
well-publicized reluctance of official lenders to perpetuate the practice of
financial bail-outs, they would be), those institutions claim for themselves a de
facto senior creditor status. Thus, either way, the bondholders would be faced
by a larger component of senior debt should a restructuring become necessary
down the road.
At the outset of this section in part B, we discuss the tactical limitations of
the use of collective decision-making clauses. Importantly, these limitations
include a continued (even if reduced) vulnerability to holdouts, as well as high
transaction costs resulting from the need to implement independent
restructurings for each outstanding bond issue. Embedded in the U.S. Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, however, may lie an as yet unexplored method for
dealing with certain kinds of sovereign debt workouts that could avoid both
problems. This solution is potentially available today for sovereigns whose
bond indebtedness is governed by the law of U.S. jurisdictions and contains a
submission to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
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V. PROCEDURAL OPTIONS FOR ACHIEVING MAJORITY CONTROL OF A
SOVEREIGN DEBT WORKOUT
The equity receivership technique of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries evolved over time to meet what the debtors and bondholders of the
day saw as a pressing need. Debt rearrangements for corporate and railroad
borrowers were occasionally necessary. There was no bankruptcy procedure in
place at the time that would accommodate such a workout (short of
liquidation) and prevent exploitation by dissident creditors. The equity
receivership solution engaged the equity powers of a U.S. court to shield the
debtor from piecemeal asset foreclosures while the stakeholders negotiated and
implemented the terms of a rearrangement.
Those equity powers still exist in U.S. courts. Indeed, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (FRCP) contain a provision, Rule 66, allowing for the
appointment of receivers "in accordance with the practice heretofore followed
in the courts of the United States." 64
The true successor to the old equity receivership technique, however, may
lie in the federal class action procedures. FRCP 23 contains the rules for the
commencement, certification, and settlement of class actions in U.S. federal
courts. The prerequisites to a class action in a federal district court are set out
in FRCP 23(a):
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law
or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
65
In addition, pursuant to FRCP 23(b), an action may be maintained as a
class action if any of the following criteria are satisfied:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create a risk of
64 FED R. CIv. P. 66.
65 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The analogy between class actions and bankruptcy has been drawn by a number
of prominent commentators. See, e.g., Stephen Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U.
ILL. L. REV. 43, 46-47 (1986).
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(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would
establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would as a practical matter be
dispositive of the interests of the other members not
parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. 66
In class actions based on FPCP 23(b)(3) above, individual members of the
class may "opt out" of the class and pursue their individual remedies. 67 If the
class is certified under FRCP 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), however, the action-and any
eventual settlement-will bind all members of the class. 68  These are
sometimes referred to as mandatory class actions.
The supervising court has very broad powers to issue orders to ensure the
69procedural fairness of the action to all members of the class. In addition, a
class action cannot be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court, and notice of any such dismissal or compromise must be given to all
members of the class.7v
If it is to avoid the holdout creditor problem, a class action commenced for
the purpose of restructuring sovereign bond indebtedness would need to be
certified as a mandatory class action under FRCP 23(b)(1) or FRCP 23(b)(2).
66 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
67 See Bryant B. Edwards et al., Mandatory Class Action Lawsuits as a Restructuring Technique, 19
PEPP. L. REV. 875, 905 (1992).
68 Id. at 898-904.
69 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d).
70 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
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One rationale for certifying mandatory class actions under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is
that claimants would otherwise be competing for a "limited fund" of assets.
71
Unless treated as a class, the first litigants may deplete the fund and
substantially impair the interests of the less agile litigants. This rationale may
apply to a sovereign borrower whose "limited fund" is the pool of scarce
foreign exchange resources from which all future external debt service
payments will need to be made. In the absence of mandatory class
certification, some litigious creditors may succeed in grabbing these assets or
compelling a preferential settlement of their claims by the sovereign. Either
way, the pool is diminished to the detriment of all other creditors. In addition,
because sovereign borrowers are unlikely to have on hand resources sufficient
to pay in cash the full amount of even compromised claims, these cases may
seek declaratory or injunctive relief requiring the borrower to issue new
72securities in exchange for existing bonds, rather than just monetary damages.
To date, a limited number of class actions have been brought by indenture
trustees under corporate bonds to obtain court approval of a proposed
settlement with bondholders, even when the indenture contained a provision
(as required by section 316(b) of the TIA) that prohibited the bondholders
themselves from voting to impair the right of nonassenting fellow bondholders
73to receive full and timely payments. The theory of these cases has been that
section 316(b) does not promise that a bondholder's claim will never be
impaired; it only promises that any such impairment will be subject to judicial
scrutiny and supervision.74  Such scrutiny and supervision is available in the
context of the class action itself.
75
71 See 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.42[2][a] (3d ed. 1999)
(describing the "limited fund" basis for certification as a non-opt out class under Rule 23(b)(l)(B)).
72 See id. § 23.43 (generally discussing injunctive or declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2)); see also
Edwards et al., supra note 67, at 907-08.
73 See, e.g., Centerre Trust Co. v. Jackson Saw Mill Co., 736 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (involving
a declaratory judgment action brought by trustee under Missouri class action rules where court affirmed a
judgment approving a settlement and making the settlement binding on all bondholders).
74 See MBank Dallas v. LaBarge, Inc., No. 86 C 9583 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 1986) (unpublished Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order). The trustee, under a defaulted debenture issue, brought a mandatory
class action for a declaratory judgment to approve a settlement of the claims. The court found that the
settlement did not deprive debentureholders of their right to sue for payment within the meaning of section
316(b) of the TIA, saying:
This lawsuit is a suit ... for enforcement of the right to receive payment of principal and interest
.... The Proposed Settlement will constitute the best available payment of such principal and
interest, and the Court has subjected the Proposed Settlement to judicial scrutiny. Individual
lawsuits by Debentureholders at this time would circumvent the best interest of the
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Class actions have also been commenced by one or more holders of
corporate bonds, as class representatives, in order to ensure that a negotiated
settlement with the issuer will bind all other bondholders.76
To our knowledge, this technique has never been used to effect a general
debt rearrangement for a foreign sovereign bond issuer.77 We are aware of one
case, however, Hirshon v. Bolivia,78 in which two holders of bonds issued by
Bolivia brought a class action in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia for recovery of the amounts due under the bonds following a
prolonged default. The plaintiffs sought certification of the class under FRCP
23(b)(3) (which permits class members to opt out). Approximately one year
after the action was filed, the plaintiffs reached a settlement with Bolivia
calling for the bonds to be redeemed at thirty-three percent of outstanding
principal. The plaintiffs argued that the settlement terms were reasonable in
light of the risk that the plaintiffs might be unable to collect on a judgment,
even if they were successful at trial.79 Class members were given one month
after notice of the proposed settlement to opt out of the class. The court then
conducted a fairness hearing and approved the settlement.
80
Debentureholders as a whole and interfere with the rights of all holders and would lead to a race to
judgment and quite possibly, to a reduced recovery for all Debentureholders.
Id. at 19-20. But see Cont'l Assurance Co. v. Macleod-Stedman, Inc., 694 F. Supp 449, 456 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(indicating that non-opt out class action could not be used to avoid the TIA's requirement of unanimous
noteholder consent to changes in payment terms, but plaintiff subsequently withdrew its request for class
certification).
75 This theory has its critics. See Richard L. Epling, Are Rule 23 Actions a Viable Alternative to the
Bankruptcy Code?, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1555 (1993) (arguing that Rule 23 is a procedural rule that cannot
override Section 316(b) of the TIA, a federal substantive law).
76 See, e.g., Kemper Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Las Colinas Corp., No. 88C 9162 (N.D. 111. July 21, 1989)
(unpublished Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order) (describing suit brought by investor
individually and as class representative of defaulted secured notes; court certified the case as mandatory class
action and approved a negotiated settlement binding on all noteholders); Harry and Jeanette Weinberg Found.,
Inc. v. Alleco, Inc., No. 91-2641 (8th Cir. 1991), appeal dismissed sub nom., Croyden Assoc. v. Alleco, Inc.,
Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 74,710 (1992) (dismissing appeal of district court's order to certify debentureholders
as a class and approve a class settlement).
77 In Carl Marks Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, plaintiff holders of Imperial Russian
Government bonds brought an action as class representatives of holders of different series of the bonds. 665 F.
Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). A default judgment against the USSR was entered but later vacated for want of
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 349.
78 C.A. No. l.95CV1957 (D.D.C. 1995), post-settlement challenge dismissed, 979 F. Supp. 908 (D.D.C.
1997).
79 Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Final Approval of the Proposed Class Action Settlement at 7,
Hirshon, C.A. No. 1.95CV01957 (D.D.C. 1995).
80 Hirshon, 979 F. Supp. at 910. While this Article was in the editing process, two class actions have
been commenced against the Republic of Argentina by separate groups purporting to represent holders of
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Restructuring sovereign bond debt through a mandatory federal class action
could achieve these objectives:
* the class action would displace individual lawsuits against the
debtor (at least in the United States);
* all similarly-situated bondholders would be treated as a single
class, thus allowing them to express a view on any proposed
settlement as an homogenized class, rather than bond
syndicate-by-bond syndicate; and
* any debt rearrangement that is worked out between the
sovereign and the bondholders may be submitted to the court
for approval and, if approved, would bind all bondholders.
Conducting a sovereign bond workout under the auspices of a U.S. federal
class action would inevitably raise a number of novel legal and practical issues.
For example, would the foreign sovereign borrower consent to the process?
Who would be appointed as representatives of the bondholder class? A class
action would only be feasible for a sovereign debtor that had issued a
significant percentage of its bonds in the United States or where the bonds
contained a choice of U.S. law and submission to the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts. To the extent that the natural geographical focus of a sovereign debt
workout is in some other country, class action litigation in the United States
may be in no one's interest.
Also, could a sovereign's non-U.S. law bonds be brought within the class
action and made subject to a settlement? Would the G-7 governments
encourage their local courts to refrain, on grounds of comity or otherwise, from
entertaining separate lawsuits or giving inconsistent judgments if lawsuits are
brought outside the United States by holders of non-U.S. law bonds? Even if
non-U.S. law bonds are included, should the chosen foreign law applicable to
those bonds guide the U.S. court, or could one confidently predict that the law
applicable to claims for money due but not paid is sufficiently similar across
most jurisdictions so as to justify the U.S. court applying its own law?
8
'
defaulted Argentine bonds. See Allan Applestein 1'E FBO D.C.A. Grantor Trust v. Republic of Argentina,
02 CV 4124 (filed May 31, 2002, N.Y.) and H.W. Urban Gmbh, D. and H. Urban Foundation v. Republic of
Argentina, 02 CV 5699 (filed July 22. 2002, N.Y.). Neither class has as yet been certified.
81 See Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate Class Actions
After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shntts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 57-67 (1986).
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How would a court deal with other categories of creditors such as the Paris
Club, the multilateral lenders, or trade creditors that could not easily be
included in a class action? Perhaps the court would decide that it could not
approve any settlement of a bondholder class action as "fair, adequate and
reasonable ' 82 until it had received confirmation that other creditor groups had
also agreed to moderate their own claims on the sovereign's foreign exchange
reserves going forward or, in the case of the multilateral creditors, agreed to
augment those reserves through new lending.
Apart from jurisdictional issues, any use of the class action mechanism to
facilitate a sovereign debt workout will have to take into account the mandates
of the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.
83
and Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor.84 In each of these cases, the Court
expressed concern that lawyers and lower courts had pushed the class action
mechanism in mass tort cases far beyond its original purpose. Among other
things, the Court said that lower courts, in deciding whether to certify a class,
should be especially wary where the class action was either "non opt-out" or
"settlement only. '8  Underlying the Court's decisions in both cases was a
concern about the potential for collusion in class actions. 86 More specifically,
the concern was with opportunistic class counsel who might put their own
interests in fees above those of the class members.
CONCLUSION
This Article has four principal objectives. First, we have tried to
demonstrate that considerations of collective decision-making have been
present in the design of most bond contracts or implicit in the legal system
since the late nineteenth century, although the manner in which the collective
action has been implemented has changed over time. Second, the relatively
diluted version of collective decision-making provisions in U.S. bonds does
82 See Edwards et al., supra note 67, at 911 (stating that commentators agree that this is the test for court
approval of a settlement).
" 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999).
84 521 U.S. 591,622 (1997).
85 See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 846-47.
86 See John C. Coffee, Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 370-72 (2000) (discussing the Court's concerns in Ortiz
and Anichem about the possibility of collusion); William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of
Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 380 (noting the Court's repeated expressions of concern in both Ortiz and
Anichen about the adequacy of class counsel's representation).
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not reflect a public policy prejudice against majoritarian debt rearrangements;
it is rather the result of historical developments that effectively forced such
workouts into the bankruptcy courts (where, in fact, supermajority creditor
control is now enshrined). Third, even existing collective decision-making
provisions in sovereign bonds may give considerably more scope for majority
creditor influence in a sovereign debt workout than some may suppose. If used
confidently and creatively, these clauses can be used to mimic, to varying
degrees, features of a corporate bankruptcy such as automatic stays,
cramdowns and DIP financings. Finally, it may be feasible to engage the
equity powers of U.S. federal courts in the oversight of some sovereign bond
workouts with the result that the bondholders can be homogenized into a single
voting class, and any court-approved compromise of the action will bind all
members of that class.
This raises the question, however, of how to explain the market's
ambivalent reaction to prior suggestions that contractual provisions such as
majority actioai clauses become a standard feature in sovereign bonds. The
official sector, starting in 1998 after the Mexican and Asian devaluation crises,
strongly urged emerging market sovereign borrowers to consider including
these provisions in their international bonds, 87 but neither the sovereign issuers
nor their institutional investor creditors showed much interest in the idea at the
time."
87 See Group of Seven, Strengthening the International Financial System and the Multilateral
Development Bank, at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/finance/fmOI0707.htm (July 7, 2001); Int'l Monetary and
Fn. Comm. of the Bd. of Governors of the Int'l Monetary Fund, Communiqu6 (Apr. 29, 2001), at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/cm/2001/010429b.htm; Group of Seven, Declaration of G-7 Finance Ministers
and Central Bank Governors (1998), at http://www.imf.org/external/np/g7/103098dc.htm; Group of Ten, The
Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crises (May 1996), at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten03.htm. See, e.g.,
BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE (1999); BARRY
EICHENGREEN & RICHARD PORTES, CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? ORDERLY WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS
(1995); Lee C. Buchheit, A Lawyer's Perspective on the New Financial Architecture, 14 J. INT'L BANKING L.
225 (1999), reprinted in THE REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE ARCHITECTURE 237 (Rosa Lastra ed.,
2001); Lee C. Buchheit, The Collective Representation Clause, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1998, at 9; Lee C.
Buchheit, Majority Action Clauses May Help Resolve Debt Crises, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1998, at 13; Lee
C. Buchheit, Changing Bond Documentation: The Sharing Clause, INT'L FIN. L. REV., July 1998, at 17; Dixon
& Wall, supra note 3; Tarullo, supra note 33, at 667-72; Tobjorn Becker et al., Bond Restructuring and Moral
Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly?, at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp0I92.pdf
(2001); Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?
(NBER Working Paper No. 7458) (2000); Eichengreen & Ruhl, supra note 34.
8g See Richard Portes, The Role of Institutions for Collective Action, in MANAGING FINANCIAL AND
CORPORATE DISTRESS, LESSONS FROM ASIA 47, 48 (Charles Adams et al. eds., 2001) ("[Mlarket participants
... appear to reject ... any effective action by the official community to promote collective action clauses
.... "); Int'l Monetary Fund, Resolving and Preventing Financial Crises: The Role of the Private Sector (Mar.
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We believe that there are a number of reasons for this resistance to the
inclusion of majority action clauses in sovereign bonds.
* For so long as sovereign borrowers and their creditors
nurtured the expectation of receiving an official sector
bailout, they saw no advantage in embracing debt instruments
that could permit a consensual restructuring without the need
for a bailout. The ready availability of bailouts, despite
repeated verbal warnings from the official sector that bailouts
were no longer on offer, virtually guaranteed that sovereign
debtors and their creditors would not give the official sector
an easy way out.
* Some sovereign borrowers worried that including these
provisions in their bonds would raise the cost of the
borrowings. Empirical research, however, has produced
varying results.
89
* Bond issuers and underwriters are in the business of selling
bonds, not preparing for future restructurings. Majority
action clauses are thus viewed in the same light as prenuptial
agreements: extraordinarily useful at the end, but distinctly
unromantic at the beginning of a relationship. Bond
underwriters, who (they hope) will not be there when the end
comes, are natural proponents of this view.
* Some sovereign borrowers may have gone so far as to
deliberately dilute the protections offered by even the
conventional forms of collective decision-making provisions
as a visible demonstration to the market that the bridge to a
future restructuring had been burnt. This bit of bravado will
be regretted, of course, if it becomes necessary to start
crawling back over the charred timbers of that bridge.
26, 2001), at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/ib/2001/032601.htm (observing the failure of the markets to
adopt collective action clauses in New York law bonds).
89 One study suggested that majority action clauses raise spreads for low credit quality borrowers and
lower them for high quality borrowers. See Eichengreen & Mody, supra note 87. Several other studies,
however, concluded that the choice of U.S. or English governing law in sovereign bonds (used as a proxy for
the presence of majority action clauses) showed no statistically significant differences in pricing. See Dixon &
Wall, supra note 3, at 146-49.
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A concern was occasionally expressed that contractual
provisions facilitating an orderly restructuring of the debt
would only invite casual requests to restructure. 90 Dilute the
horror of a sovereign debt restructuring, this theory contends,
and you will have more frequent restructurings.
We believe that the market's bashfulness about securing and employing
mechanisms that will ensure majority creditor control of future sovereign debt
workouts is misguided. The presence or absence of majority decision-making
provisions in bonds does not influence a sovereign's decision to embark on a
restructuring. The cost and the consequences-political, social, and
financial-of a generalized debt restructuring are typically so high that no
sovereign takes this step lightly. Indeed, if history teaches any lesson, it is that
sovereigns often delay taking necessary debt management measures until a
point when the severity of those measures is needlessly aggravated. In today's
world, the institutional (mark-to-market) investors in sovereign bonds share
fully in the horror of a sovereign debt meltdown. The greater risk to these
investors does not lie in the threat of casual defaults; it lies in the prospect of
messy and ill-defined workout procedures that leave assets languishing on the
lenders' books at default levels for long periods of time and invite exploitation
by opportunistic creditors.
90 But see Andy Haldane, Private Sector Involvement in Financial Crisis: Analytics and Public Policy
Approaches, FIN. STABILITY REV., Nov. 1999, at 184, 196 (suggesting that collective action clauses could-if
they were perceived as insuring against a disorderly grab for assets-actually lower the cost of sovereign bond
finance). Investors who hold this view would presumably be distressed to learn that in 1937 the SEC
recommended that a stated percentage of the fees paid to the underwriters of sovereign bond issues be
deducted and held to defray the costs of future sovereign bond restructurings. See V SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM'N, supra note 10, at 746.
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APPENDIX A
Description of English-Style Majority Action Clause*
12. Meetings of Noteholders, Modification and Waiver
(a) Meetings of Noteholders
The Agency Agreement contains provisions for convening meetings of
Noteholders to consider matters relating to the Notes, including the
modification of any provision of these Conditions or the Deed of Covenant.
Any such modification may be made if sanctioned by an Extraordinary
Resolution (as defined below).
The quorum at any such meeting for passing an Extraordinary Resolution
shall be two or more persons holding or representing a clear majority of the
principal amount of the Notes for the time being outstanding, or at any
adjourned meeting two or more persons being or representing Noteholders
whatever the principal amount of the Notes for the time being outstanding so
held or represented, except that at any meeting the business of which includes
consideration of proposals, inter alia, (i) to modify the maturity of the Notes or
the dates on which interest is payable in respect of the Notes, (ii) to reduce or
cancel the principal amount of, or interest on, the Notes, (iii) to change the
currency of payment of the Notes, or (iv) to modify the provisions concerning
the quorum required at any meeting of Noteholders or the majority required to
pass an Extraordinary Resolution, the necessary quorum for passing an
Extraordinary Resolution shall be two or more persons holding or representing
not less than 75 per cent., or at any adjourned such meeting not less than 25 per
cent., of the principal amount of the Notes for the time being outstanding.
As used in this Condition 12, "Extraordinary Resolution" means a
resolution passed at a meeting of the Noteholders duly convened and held in
accordance with the provisions contained in these Conditions and the Agency
Agreement by a majority consisting of not less than 75 per cent. of the persons
voting thereat upon a show of hands or if a poll shall be duly demanded then
by a majority consisting of not less than 75 per cent. of the votes given on the
poll. An Extraordinary Resolution passed at any meeting of Noteholders will
be binding on all Noteholders, whether or not they are present at the meeting.




Description of U.S.-Style Amendment Clause: Version One*
Modifications, Amendments and Waivers
With (i) the affirmative vote, in person or by proxy thereunto duly
authorized in writing, of the holders of not less than 66% in aggregate principal
amount of the Notes then Outstanding represented at a meeting duly called and
held as specified above, or (ii) the written consent of the owners of 66% in
aggregate principal amount of the Outstanding Notes, the Republic and the
Fiscal Agent may, upon agreement between themselves, modify, amend or
supplement the terms of the Notes or, insofar as affects the Notes, the Fiscal
Agency Agreement, in any way, and such holders may make, take or give any
request, demand, authorization, direction, notice, consent, waiver or other
action provided by the Fiscal Agency Agreement or the Notes to be made,
given or taken by holders of Notes: provided, however, that no such action
may, without the consent or affirmative vote of the holder of each Note
affected thereby: (A) change the due date for the payment of the principal of,
or any installment of interest on, any Note, (B) reduce the principal amount of
any Note, or the portion of such principal amount which is payable upon
acceleration of the maturity of such Note, or the interest rate thereon, (C)
change the currency in which any payment in respect of any Note is payable,
(D) reduce the proportion of the principal amount of the Notes the vote or
consent of the holders of which is necessary to modify, amend or supplement
the Fiscal Agency Agreement or the terms and conditions of the Notes or to
make, take or give any request, demand, authorization, direction, notice,
consent, waiver or other action provided thereby to be made, taken or given, or
(E) change the obligation of the Republic to pay Additional Amounts (as
defined below). Any such modification, amendment or supplement shall be
binding on the holders of Notes.
. From Republic of Guatemala, 812% Notes due 2007, U.S. $150,000,000.
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APPENDIX C
Description of U.S.-Style Amendment Clause: Version Two*
Modification
The Republic may modify any of the terms or provisions contained in the
Bonds in any way with the written consent of the holders of not less than 51%
in principal amount of the Bonds at the time outstanding, provided that (i) if
any such modification would change the terms or currency of payment of the
principal amount of or interest on any Bond or the amounts thereof or affect
the rights of holders of less than all the Bonds at the time outstanding, the
consent of the holders of all the Bonds affected thereby is required and (ii) if
any such modification would reduce the aforesaid percentage needed for
authorization of such modification, the consent of the holders of all
outstanding Bonds is required.
* From Republic of Indonesia, 73/% Bonds due 2006, U.S. $400,000,000.
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